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ADJOINT REPRESENTATIONS OF BLACK BOX GROUPS
PSL2pFqq
ALEXANDRE BOROVIK AND S¸U¨KRU¨ YALC¸INKAYA
Abstract. Given a black box group Y encrypting PSL2pFq over an unknown
field F of unknown odd characteristic p and a global exponent E for Y (that is,
an integer E such that yE “ 1 for all y P Y), we present a Las Vegas algorithm
which constructs a unipotent element in Y. The running time of our algorithm
is polynomial in logE. This answers the question posed by Babai and Beals in
1999. We also find the characteristic of the underlying field in time polynomial
in logE and linear in p.
Furthermore, we construct, in probabilistic time polynomial in logE,
‚ a black box group X encrypting PGL2pFq – SO3pFq, its subgroup Y˝
of index 2 isomorphic to Y and a probabilistic polynomial in logE time
isomorphism Y˝ ÝÑ Y;
‚ a black box field K, and
‚ polynomial time, in logE, isomorphisms
SO3pKq ÝÑ X ÝÑ SO3pKq.
If, in addition, we know p and the standard explicitly given finite field
Fq isomorphic to the field F then we construct, in time polynomial in logE,
isomorphism
SO3pFqq ÝÑ SO3pKq.
Unlike many papers on black box groups, our algorithms make no use of
additional oracles other than the black box group operations. Moreover, our
result acts as an SL2-oracle in the black box group theory.
We implemented our algorithms in GAP and tested them for groups such
as PSL2pFq for |F| “ 115756986668303657898962467957 (a prime number).
1. Introduction
1.1. The principal results. Black box groups were introduced by Babai and Sze-
mere´di [8] as an idealized setting for randomized algorithms for solving permutation
and matrix group problems in computational group theory. A black box group is a
black box (or an oracle, or a device, or an algorithm) operating with 0–1 strings of
uniform length which encrypt (not necessarily in a unique way) elements of some
finite group. In various classes of black box problems the isomorphism type of the
encrypted group could be known in advance or unknown.
We denote a black box group encrypting a group X by using the same letter in
sans serif, X, and we apply the same convention to the strings x produced by X
which correspond to the group element x P X .
All black box groups in this paper are assumed to satisfy Axioms BB1–BB4
stated in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. In particular, we assume that for every black box
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group X we are given a global exponent, that is, an integer E such that xE “ 1 for
all x P X , and the computation of xE is feasible.
In this paper, we present an algorithm which solves the old problem by Babai
and Beals [6, Problem 10.1] that remained open since 1999. We prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 1.1. Let Y be a black box group encrypting Y “ PSL2pFq, where F
is an unknown finite field of unknown odd characteristic p and let E be a global
exponent for Y. Assume also that |F| ě 7. Then there exists a Las Vegas algorithm
which constructs a string representing a non-trivial unipotent element from Y in
time polynomial in logE. In particular, the characteristic p of the underlying field
can be found in time polynomial in logE and linear in p.
For a discussion of randomized algorithms and, in particular, Las Vegas algo-
rithms, see Section 1.3.
In case of p “ 2, the Babai-Beals problem has been solved by Kantor and Kass-
abov [28], and in Section 4.9 we briefly discuss how our methods can also be applied
to this case.
We exclude small cases |F| ă 7 from consideration in this paper because they
– and, more generally, black box recognition of classical matrix groups over small
fields are comprehensively treated in the memoir by Kantor and Seress [29].
Note that, in Theorem 1.1, we do not have any information about the ground
field of the group Y . However, we use some form of an upper bound on the size
of this field which is implicitly present in the global exponent E. Note also that
we construct a unipotent element without knowing its order and our algorithm is
Las Vegas due to the unipotency test, Lemma 5.5. To find the characteristic of the
underlying field, we construct a unipotent element and then find its order.
In the special case when our black box group Y is explicitly represented by
matrices, Theorem 1.1 takes the form that also remained unknown until now.
Corollary 1.2. Let p be an odd prime number. Given matrices g1, . . . , gm in the
group GLnpFpkq of invertible matrices over a finite field Fpk of odd characteristic
p which generate subgroup G isomorphic to SL2pFplq, pl ě 7, we can find in G a
non-trivial unipotent element in probabilistic time polynomial in k, l,m, n and log p.
Our algorithm is Las Vegas.
Our next result is a solution to the problem of recognizing a black box group
encrypting the group PSL2pFq defined over an unknown field of unknown odd char-
acteristic.
Theorem 1.3. Let Y be a black box group encrypting PSL2pFq, where F is an
unknown field of unknown odd characteristic p and let E be a global exponent for
Y. Assume also that |F| ě 7. Then we construct, in probabilistic time polynomial
in logE,
(a) a black box group X encrypting the group SO3pFq, its subgroup Y˝ of index 2
isomorphic to Y and a probabilistic polynomial in logE time isomorphism
Y˝ ÝÑ Y;
(b) a black box field K, and
(c) polynomial time, in logE, isomorphisms
SO3pKq ÝÑ X ÝÑ SO3pKq.
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Our algorithms are Las Vegas. If, in addition, we know p and the standard explicitly
given finite field Fq of characteristic p isomorphic to F then we construct, in logE-
time, an isomorphism
SO3pFqq ÝÑ SO3pKq.
Since, by Theorem 1.1, we can find the characteristic p of the underlying field in
time linear in p and polynomial in logE, and also because finding efficient two-way
isomorphisms between a black box field of order pn and an explicitly given standard
field can be done in time linear in p and polynomial in time n log p (see Section 3),
we have a stronger result:
Corollary 1.4. Let X be a black box group encrypting SO3pFq, where F is an
unknown field of unknown odd characteristic p and let E be a global exponent for X.
Assume also that |F| ě 7. Then we construct, in time linear in p and polynomial
in logE, an isomorphism
XÐÑ SO3pFqq,
where Fq is the standard explicitly given finite field isomorphic to F.
We note here that our algorithm fully replaces the so-called “SL2-oracle”, an
assumption of existence of two-way polynomial-time isomorphism between arbitrary
black box group encrypting SL2pFpkq and the group SL2pFpkq over the standard
explicitly given field Fpk . Moreover, we do not use discrete logarithm oracle on
finite fields in our algorithms as opposed to majority of the existing algorithms for
black box groups. (Given a generator x of F˚ and a random element y P F, a
discrete logarithm oracle finds an integer k which satisfies xk “ y.) The first use
of an “SL2-oracle” appeared in 2001; quite a number of papers referring to SL2-
oracle and discrete logarithm oracle followed [17, 18, 19, 20]. The present paper
together with [13, 14] shows the way to eliminate discrete logarithm oracle and
SL2-oracle entirely from black box recognition problems for classical groups of odd
characteristic.
By replacing the axiom BB4 with BB5 (stated in Subsection 2.3), that is, re-
moving the assumption of knowing a global exponent E for the black box groups
and assuming to have a function which computes square roots of group elements,
when exist, we have the following more general result. It explains, in particular,
why the characteristic of the field is not used in our Theorems 1.1 and 1.3.
Theorem 1.5. Y be a black box group which satisfies axioms BB1–BB3 and en-
crypts the group PSL2pFq over some unknown finite field F of unknown odd char-
acteristic p with |F| ě 7. Assume also that Axiom BB5 holds in Y. Then we can
construct, in probabilistic time polynomial in logE,
(a) a black box group X encrypting the group SO3pFq, its subgroup Y˝ of index 2
isomorphic to Y and a probabilistic polynomial in logE time isomorphism
Y˝ ÝÑ Y;
(b) a black box field K, and
(c) polynomial time, in logE, isomorphisms
SO3pKq ÝÑ X ÝÑ SO3pKq.
Our algorithms are Las Vegas.
We record this result here, but its discussion will be published by us elsewhere; it
is linked to work by Ahmavaara [1, 2, 3], Kustaanheimo [30], and other theoretical
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physicists who attempted to build a model of quantum mechanics based on a very
big prime field. Recently, this theory was revisited by Zilber [42] who used a
model-theoretic approach to the idea of “quantization by looking at everything
as if it happens in a finite field”. Our Theorem 1.5 appears to fit well into an
emerging theory linking model theory with physics: in view of [42, Proposition
5.2], finite groups PGL2pFq structurally approximate, in some explicitly defined
sense, the Minkowski group PSL2pCq.
1.2. A very brief outline of the proof. The proof of Theorem 1.3 will be
achieved as a sequence of steps some of which are interesting on their own.
(a) We construct a new black box group X encrypting SO3pFq, a group which
contains PSL2pFq as a subgroup Y˝ of index 2, and map
Y˝ ãÑ Y,
see Theorem 5.1.
(b) Using involutions in X, we construct a black box projective plane P that
encrypts the projective plane of the 3-dimensional space of the adjoint
representation of PGL2pFq » SO3pFq on its Lie algebra l “ sl2pFq. We
describe how to produce random points in P, describe lines through two
points, construct intersection of two lines, etc. We shall note here that we
do not list the elements in P or in any line in P. Furthermore, the plane
P has polarity induced by the Killing form on its underlying Lie algebra.
The Lie algebra product induces on P a partial binary operation which we
are able to compute using black box methods; we denote this operation by
b, call cross product and systematically use in algorithms developed in the
paper.
(c) We introduce a set of tools which allows us to coordinatize P by homo-
geneous coordinates over a black box field K constructed in the projective
plane P. To that end, we use a classical coordinatization of Desarguesian
projective planes developed by Hilbert.
(d) We use the action of X on P to construct a matrix representation
X ÝÑ SO3pKq.
where SO3pKq is realized as a group of 3 ˆ 3 matrices over the black box
field K.
(e) Coordinatizing SO3pKq in a similar way, we construct an isomorphism
SO3pKq ÝÑ X.
(f) The map
SO3pFqq ÝÑ SO3pKq
is constructed from the isomorphism
Fq ÝÑ K
from the explicitly given finite field F onto a black box field K. We use a
result by Maurer and Raub [33] formulated in our paper as Theorem 3.1
to construct this isomorphism. This is a polynomial time algorithm which
runs in time log |Fq|. (All known algorithms for the inverse isomorphism
Fq ÐÝ K
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are reduced to solving discrete logarithm problem in Fp, the prime sub-
field of Fq, so finding polynomial time algorithms which construct two-way
isomorphisms represent a major open problem in algebraic cryptography).
(g) Section 12 contains analysis of complexities of all algorithms used in the
proof.
1.3. Monte-Carlo and Las Vegas algorithms. Recall that a Monte-Carlo al-
gorithm is a randomized algorithm which gives a correct output with probability
strictly bigger than 1{2. A special case of Monte–Carlo algorithms is a Las Ve-
gas algorithm which either outputs a correct answer or reports failure. A detailed
comparison of Monte–Carlo and Las Vegas algorithms, both from practical and
theoretical point, can be found in [5].
By the nature of our axioms, many algorithms for black box groups (in the
sense of Axioms BB1–BB4) are Monte-Carlo. In case of decision problems, where
the output is “yes” or “no”, the error of a Monte–Carlo algorithm can be made
arbitrarily close to 0 by repeatedly re-running it. So answers to questions of the
kind “Is this black box group isomorphic to the given group?” can be made as
precise as we wish. In this paper, algorithms are Las Vegas.
1.4. Terminology and notation. In what follows we make extensive use of the
language of projective geometry, see, for example Coxeter [22] and Hartshorne [26].
Group theoretic terminology mostly follows [23].
1.5. Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we discuss the axioms of black
box groups. Section 3 contains a brief discussion of black box fields. In Section 4,
we introduce morphisms and protomorphisms of black box groups and the crucially
important procedure that we call “reification of an involution”. We also explain
how our arguments work in even characteristic producing a unipotent element in
PSL2p2nq. In Section 5, we present applications of reification of involutions, in
particular, we construct a black box group encrypting SO3pFq from a black box
group encrypting PSL2pFq. In Section 6, we discuss the geometry of involutions
in SO3pFq, and in Section 7 we construct a black box projective plane and present
algorithms for additional operations and relations coming from the underlying Lie
algebra. In Section 8, we construct a black box subgroup encrypting Sym4 in a
black box group encrypting SO3pFq (it provides us with an orthogonal basis in the
projective plane with a polarity) and in Section 9, we apply Hilbert’s coordinatiza-
tion to the black box projective plane and construct a black box field. In Section
10, we prove Theorem 1.1 and in Section 11, we prove Theorem 1.3. In Section 12,
we give the complexities of the procedures presented in this paper.
2. Black box groups
2.1. Axioms for black box groups. What follows are slightly modified Babai-
Szmere´di axioms.
The concept of a black box can be applied to rings, fields, and, as we can see in
this paper, even to projective planes. So, we formulate our axioms for groups but
use the wording which makes them applicable to other algebraic structures. This
explains why we are using the length lpXq of strings produced by a black box X as a
proxy for the complexity of a black box X: it is applicable to a variety of structures.
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In our algorithms, we have to work with several black box groups at once and
build new black boxes (sometimes for the same abstract group, sometimes for dif-
ferent groups) from existing ones. For that reason we specify the functionality of a
family X of black boxes X by the following axioms.
BB1 On request, each X produces a binary string of fixed length lpXq (which
depends on X) encrypting a random (almost) uniformly distributed element
from some fixed group X ; this is done in probabilistic time polynomial in
lpXq.
BB2 Each X computes, in probabilistic time polynomial in lpXq, a string encrypt-
ing the product of two strings or an inverse of a string (that is, a string
encrypting the inverse of an element given by a string).
BB3 Each X decides, in probabilistic time polynomial in lpXq, whether two
strings encrypt the same element in its group X – therefore identification
of strings agrees with the canonical projection
X .........
piX
✲ X.
If Axioms BB1–BB3 hold for a particular black box group X, we say that X is
a black box over X , or that a black box X encrypts the group X . Notice that we
are not making any assumptions of practical computability or the time complexity
of the projection πX. We will discuss our set up and terminology further in Section
4.2.
In respect of Axiom BB1, we note here that a black box group X encrypting
a finite group X may not necessarily be given by generators: see, for example,
discussion of black boxes for centralizers of involutions [11], or discussion of links
between black box algebra and homomorphic encryption [12]. When a black box
group X is given by some generators, that is, some strings x1, x2, . . . , xm in X such
that X “ xπXpx1q, πXpx2q, . . . , πXpxmqy, then producing random elements from X
can be done by using either the algorithm presented in [4, Theorem 1.1] or the
algorithm called “the product replacement algorithm” [21]. It turned out that
the product replacement algorithm is much more practical and we refer reader to
[7, 32, 35, 36] for its detailed analysis.
In this paper, we systematically build new black box groups from old ones, and
use randomized algorithms for their constructions. In this situation, operations in
these new black boxes are performed by randomized algorithms – this explains the
randomization introduced in Axioms BB2 and BB3.
A typical example of a black box group is provided by a group X generated in a
big matrix group GLnprkq by several matrices x1, . . . , xl. We can, of course, mul-
tiply, invert, compare matrices. Therefore computer routines for these operations
together with the sampling of the product replacement algorithm run on a tuple of
generators px1, . . . , xlq can be viewed as a black box X encrypting the group X .
2.2. Global exponent and Axiom BB4. Notice that, even in routine examples,
the number of elements of a matrix group X could be astronomical. This makes
many natural questions about the black box X over X – for example, finding the
order of X or the isomorphism type of X when X is given as a simple group
of Lie type – inaccessible for all known deterministic methods. Even when X is
cyclic, existing approaches to finding its order are conditional and involve either
the discrete logarithm problem or prime factorization of large integers.
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Nevertheless black box problems for finite groups frequently have a feature which
makes them more accessible:
BB4 We are given a global exponent of X, that is, a natural number E :“ EpXq
such that
‚ xE “ 1 for all strings x produced by X; and
‚ logE is polynomially bounded in terms of lpXq.
For example, if X is a black box group arising from a subgroup in the known
ambient group G, the exponent of G can be taken for a global exponent of X.
If we know the factorization of E into prime factors then we can find the order
of any element x produced by X as the minimal divisor e of E such that xe “ 1.
However, we wish to work with linear groups over fields of large characteristic
where factorization of E is becoming unfeasible. Our approach allows us to avoid
determination of orders of random elements from X and consequently avoid making
any assumptions about the prime factorization of the global exponent.
2.3. Axiom BB5. It is important to observe that our proof of Theorem 1.3 uses
the global exponent E and Axiom BB4 only for computing square roots of semisim-
ple elements in Y and X (this is done by Tonelli-Shanks algorithm, Lemma 5.6).
Therefore Axiom BB4 can be replaced by its corollary, Axiom BB5 – see Theorem
1.5.
BB5 We are given a partial 1- or 2-valued function ρ of two variables on a subset
S Ă X that computes, in probabilistic time polynomial in lpXq, square roots
in cyclic subgroups of X in the following sense:
if x P S and y P xxy has square roots in xxy then ρpx, yq is the set
of these roots.
In particular,
‚ if |x| is even, ρpx, 1q is the subgroup of order 2 in xxy;
‚ if |x| is even then, consecutively applying ρpx, ¨q to 2-elements in xxy, we
can find 2-elements in xxy of every order present;
‚ if |x| is odd, and x P xxy then ρpx, xq is the unique square root of x in xxy.
We emphasize that Axiom BB5 provides everything needed for construction of
centralizers of involutions by the maps ζ0 and ζ1, Section 4.7.
Axiom BB5 follows from BB4 by Lemma 5.6, applied to the cyclic group xxy.
3. Black box fields
We define black box fields using, by analogy with black box groups, Axioms BB1–
BB3, with a few obvious changes in the wording, and with Axiom BB2 covering the
addition, multiplication, and inversion in the field. The reader may wish to compare
our exposition with [10]. We remind that, in this paper, we do not necessarily know
the characteristic of the field. Therefore we slightly generalize the definition of a
black box field given in [10, 33] by removing the assumption that the characteristic
of the field is known. We refer the reader to [10, 33] for more details of black box
fields of known characteristic.
We shall be using some results about the isomorphism problem for black box
fields of known characteristic p [33], that is, the problem of constructing an iso-
morphism and its inverse between a black box field K and an explicitly given finite
field Fpn . The explicit data for a finite field of cardinality p
n is defined to be a
system of structure constants over the prime field, that is, n3 elements pcijkqni,j,k“1
8 ALEXANDRE BOROVIK AND S¸U¨KRU¨ YALC¸INKAYA
of the prime field Fp “ Z{pZ (represented as integers in r0, p ´ 1s) so that Fpn
becomes a field with ordinary addition and multiplication by elements of Fp, and
multiplication determined by
sisj “
nÿ
k“1
cijksk,
where s1, s2, . . . , sn denotes a basis of Fpn over Fp. The concept of an explicitly
given field of order pn is robust; indeed, Lenstra Jr. has shown in [31, Theorem 1.2]
that for any two fields A and B of order pn given by two sets of structure constants
paijkqni,j,k“1 and pbijkqni,j,k“1 an isomorphism A ÝÑ B can be constructed in time
polynomial in n log p.
By an efficient isomorphism between a black box field and an explicitly given
finite field Fpn , we mean an algorithm constructing such an isomorphism in time
polynomial in n and log p.
One of the key results on black box fields belongs to Maurer and Raub [33]; its
statement and proof can be reformulated to yield the following result.
Theorem 3.1. Let K be a black box field of known characteristic p encrypting an
explicitly given finite field Fpn and K0 the prime subfield of K. Then the isomor-
phism problem between K and Fpn can be efficiently reduced to the isomorphism
problem between K0 and Fp. In particular,
‚ an efficient isomorphism K0 ÝÑ Fp can be extended in time polynomial in
the input length lpKq to an efficient isomorphism K ÝÑ Fpn ;
‚ there exists an isomorphism Fpn ÝÑ K computable in polynomial in lpKq
time.
The existence of an efficient isomorphism K0 ÝÑ Fp would follow from solution
of the discrete logarithm problem in K0. In particular, this means that, for small
primes p, every black box field of order pn is effectively isomorphic to Fpn .
4. Morphisms and protomorphisms
This section contains crucial tools for our algorithms. They are based on a simple
observation that a map
X ..........
φ
✲ Y
from a group to a group is a homomorphism of groups if and only if its graph
F “ tpx, φpxqq : x P Xu
is a subgroup of X ˆ Y . Essentially we treat homomorphisms of black box groups
as black box groups on their own, see Section 4.4. With this principle, almost
everything in this section is self-evident.
First, we introduce some terminology.
4.1. Morphisms. Given two black boxes X and Y encrypting finite groups X and
Y , respectively, we say that a map φ which assigns strings produced by X to strings
produced by Y is a morphism of black box groups, if
‚ the map φ is computable in probabilistic time polynomial in lpXq and lpYq,
and
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‚ there is a homomorphism φ : X Ñ Y such that the following diagram is
commutative:
X
φ
✲ Y
X
piX
❄
.........
φ
✲ Y
piY
❄
.........
where πX and πY are the canonical projections of X and Y onto X and Y ,
respectively.
We shall say in this situation that a morphism φ encrypts the homomorphism
φ. For example, morphisms arise naturally when a black box group X is given by a
generating set and we replace a generating set for the black box group X by a more
convenient one and run the product replacement algorithm for the new generating
set; in fact, we replace a black box for X and deal with a morphism Y ÝÑ X from
a new black box Y into X.
We apply to morphisms and abstract homomorphisms the same notational con-
vention as to the strings and elements, using the same letters in sans serifed or
plain version, respectively.
Since different strings produced by Y may represent the same element in Y ,
replacing strings φpxq by equivalent strings produces a new morphism φ1 which
also encrypts φ and, for all the practical purpose is the same as φ.
Slightly abusing terminology, we say that a morphism φ is an injection, or a
surjection, etc., if φ has these properties. In accordance with standard conventions,
hooked arrows ãÑ stand for injections; dotted arrows are reserved for homomor-
phisms, including natural projections
X .........
piX
✲ X ;
which are not necessarily morphisms, since, by the very nature of black box prob-
lems, we are not given an efficient procedure for constructing the projection of a
black box onto the group it encrypts.
4.2. Black box subgroups and further remarks on terminology. If we have
an injection
Y Ă
φ
✲ X
Y
piY
❄
.........
Ă
φ
✲ X
piX
❄
.........
we say that Y is a black box subgroup of X encrypting Y ď X . We emphasize that
a black box subgroup is a procedure and has to be treated as such especially when
one writes a computer code for black box group algorithm. Notice that different
black box subgroups may encrypt the same subgroup. Indeed, an element in Y can
be encrypted by several different strings produced from X; it is important to take
into consideration a possibility that not all of these strings are produced by Y.
If elements πYpy1q, . . . , πYpykq generate Y , we call strings y1, . . . , yk generators
of Y.
Black box subgroups will be constructed in this paper in one of the following
ways:
10 ALEXANDRE BOROVIK AND S¸U¨KRU¨ YALC¸INKAYA
‚ We pick some strings y1, . . . , ym produced by the black box group X and we
treat them as generators of a black box subgroup Y. We use the product
replacement algorithm [21] for random sampling.
‚ Given black box subgroups Y1, . . . ,Yk in X, we generate a subgroup
Y “ xY1, . . . ,Yky
by taking generating sets in Yi and combining them into a generating set
in Y.
‚ If Y is the centralizer in X of an involution or a proto-involution in the
sense of Section 4.6 then we apply the procedure described in Section 4.7
to “populate” Y and eventually find a generating set for Y.
Terminology and conventions. Abusing terminology and notation, we write
x P X for a string x produced by the black box group X and we say that x is
an element of X. In the rest of the paper, a subgroup of a black box group is meant
to refer to a black box subgroup. The order opxq (“ |x|) of x is opxq “ |x|. We shall
refer to a string x P X as an involution, or a semisimple element, or a unipotent
element, etc., if x P X is an element with these properties. If x P X is an involution,
then CXpxq denotes a black box subgroup encrypting CXpxq, see Section 4.7 for a
construction of CXpxq. Moreover, we refer to black box subgroups in X as to tori,
unipotent groups, etc., if they encrypt subgroups in X with these properties.
4.3. Direct and semidirect products of black box groups. Assume that X
encrypts X and Y encrypts Y . Then the black box XˆY produces pairs of strings
px, yq by sampling X and Y independently, with operations carried out component-
wise in X and Y; of course, Xˆ Y encrypts X ˆ Y and lpXˆ Yq “ lpXq ` lpYq.
More generally, given black box groups X1, . . . ,Xn, we can define their direct
product
X “ X1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Xn
in an expected way, consecutively sampling strings xi P Xi to form a random n-tuple
px1, . . . , xnq and carrying out group operations on these n-tuples componentwise.
Later in the paper, we will use semidirect products of black box groups. They
arise in a situation when we have two black box group X and Y and a polynomial
time in lpXq and lpYq procedure for the action of Y on X by automorphisms,
Xˆ Y ÝÑ X, px, yq ÞÑ xy;
then X¸Y samples independent pairs px, yq of strings from X and Y with multipli-
cation performed and inversion by the rules
(1) px1, y1q ˝ px2, y2q :“ px1xy12 , y1y2q and px, yq´1 :“ ppx´1qy
´1
, y´1q.
4.4. Morphisms as black box groups. Given a morphism
X
φ
✲ Y
X
piX
❄
.........
φ
✲ Y
piY
❄
.........
of black box groups, we can associate with it a black box subgroup Z ãÑ X ˆ Y
which encrypts the graph F “ tpx, φpxq : x P Xqu of φ. The black box group Z
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produces strings tpx,φpxqqu with x is sampled by the black box X and the natural
projection is defined as
πZ : Z ÝÑ F
px,φpxqq ÞÑ pπXpxq, φpπXpxqq.
In practice, this means that we find strings x1, . . . , xk generating X with known
images y1 “ φpx1q, . . . , yk “ φpxkq in Y and then use the product replacement
algorithm for the black box subgroup
Z˚ “ xpx1, y1q, . . . , pxk, ykqy ãÑ Xˆ Y
encrypting a subgraph t px,φpxqq u of the homomorphism φ. Random sampling of
the black box Z˚ returns strings x P X with their images φpxq P Y already attached.
4.5. Protomorphisms. Let X and Y be two black box groups encryptingX and Y ,
respectively, and π the canonical projection of XˆY onto XˆY . A protomorphism
Z between black box groups X and Y is a black box subgroup Z ãÑ XˆY such that
πZpZq is the graph of a homomorphism from X to Y or from Y to X – the direction
of homomorphism is not set here. We say that Z encrypts this homomorphism.
Given a string x in a black box group X encrypting a group X , it is frequently
useful to associate with x a black box for the graph of a specific automorphism of
X , namely, the conjugation by πXpxq. It can be viewed as a black box subgroup
Cx ãÑ X ˆ X, which produces strings py, yxq for random strings y P X, with group
operations and equality relation defined in the obvious way.
Treating a homomorphism X ÝÑ Y of black box groups X and Y as a black box
subgroup in their direct product XˆY allows us to construct previously inaccessible
objects – see, for example, “reification of involutions”, Section 4.8.
4.6. Amalgamation of local proto-automorphisms. Let X be a black box
group encrypting a group X . Expanding the terminology from the previous section,
a proto-automorphism F on X is a black box subgroup F ãÑ Xˆ X for the graph of
an automorphism of X.
Assume that black box subgroups Y1, . . . ,Yk of X are encrypting, respectively,
subgroups Y1, . . . , Yk of X , and assume that xY1, . . . , Yky “ X . Assume that
φ1, . . . , φk are automorphisms of subgroups Y1, . . . , Yk, respectively, and Fi are
proto-automorphisms on Yi encrypting φi, i “ 1, . . . , k. We say that the system of
proto-automorphisms F1, . . . ,Fk is consistent if there exists a unique automorphism
φ of X such that φi “ φ |Yi for all i “ 1, . . . , k.
Theorem 4.1 (Amalgamation of local proto-automorphisms). If F1, . . . ,Fk is a
consistent system of proto-automorphisms on black box subgroups in X, then
F “ xF1, . . . ,Fky
is a proto-automorphism on X.
Proof. The proof is self-evident. 
We call F the amalgam of proto-automorphisms F1, . . . ,Fk.
Theorem 4.2 (Augmentation of a black box group by a proto-involution). If
A ãÑ Xˆ X
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is a proto-automorphism on X encrypting an involutive automorphism α on X, we
can construct an involutive automorphism α of A by setting
α : px, x1q ÞÑ px1, xq for px, x1q P A.
Then the semidirect product A ¸ t1,αu is a black box encrypting X ¸ xαy, with A
canonically projecting onto X and α projecting to α.
Proof. The proof is self-evident. 
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 provide the conceptional frame for a construction of a black
group encrypting SO3pFq » PGL2pFq from a black box group encrypting PSL2pFq,
see Theorem 5.1.
4.7. Centralizer of a proto-involution. Let A ãÑ XˆX be a proto-involution on
X defined in Section 4.6. Assume that A encrypts some involutive automorphism
α P AutpXq of X . Later in the paper, we work in the situation when α is an
external automorphism and α is not present as a string in the black box group. In
this case, we do not have any access to α but we can make use of its graph. Given
A, we shall construct a black box group, which we denote it as CXrAs, encrypting
CXpαq. Let A “ tpx, xαq P X ˆ X | x P Xu be the graph of α. Obviously, by
writing formally
CX rAs “ tx P X | there exists y P X such that px, yq P A and x “ yu,
we get CXpαq “ CX rAs. We will construct a black box subgroup CXrAs ãÑ X which
satisfies a similar condition
CXrAs “ tx P X | there exists y P X such that px, yq P A and πXpxq “ πXpyqu,
and encrypts CX rAs.
It follows from the arguments in [11, 16] that we have the map ζ “ ζ0 \ ζ1:
ζ : X ÝÑ CXpαq
x ÞÑ
"
ζ0pxq “ ipxαx´1q if opxαx´1q is even
ζ1pxq “
?
xαx´1 ¨ x if opxαx´1q is odd,
where ipxq is the unique involution and ?x is the unique square root of x in the
cyclic group xxy of odd order.
Notice that the map above can be written in the following way using the graph
A of α instead of α.
ζ : A ÝÑ CX rAs “ CXpαq
px, yq ÞÑ
"
ζ0ppx, yqq “ ipyx´1q if opyx´1q is even
ζ1ppx, yqq “
a
yx´1 ¨ x if opyx´1q is odd.
Assume that X satisfies Axiom BB4 and has a global exponent E “ 2km with
m odd.
If x P X is a string encrypting an element of even order then the last non-identity
string in the sequence
1 ‰ xm, pxmq2, pxmq22 , . . . , pxmq2k´1 , pxmq2k “ 1
is an involution and denoted by ipxq.
If x P X encrypts an element of odd order then y :“ xpm`1q{2 obviously satisfies
y2 “ x and is a square root of x in xxy; we denote y :“ ?x.
Hence, we have the analogous map for the black box groups.
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ζ : A ÝÑ CXrAs
px, yq ÞÑ
"
ζ0ppx, yqq “ ipyx´1q if opyx´1q is even
ζ1ppx, yqq “
a
yx´1 ¨ x if opyx´1q is odd.(2)
If X is a simple group of Lie type then, as shown in [37], ζ1pxq is defined for
random x P X with probability Op1{nq where n is the Lie rank of X . Furthermore,
the same calculation as in [11, Section 6] proves that elements πXpζ1px, yqq, for
px, yq P A, are uniformly distributed over CXpαq. Therefore ζ1 provides an efficient
black box for CXrAs.
If A is a graph of an inner automorphism corresponding to an element a P X, we
denote CXrAs by CXpaq.
For the black box groups X encrypting PSL2pFq or PGL2pFq, where F is a finite
field of odd characteristic, we can construct a generating set for CXpaq in the follow-
ing way, if needed. We know that CXpaq “ T ¸ xwy, where T is the maximal torus
containing the involution a and w inverts T. Since the map ζ1 produces uniformly
distributed elements in X, by [34, I.8], a set of size Oplog log |F|q consisting of ran-
dom elements in C contains a generator for T with probability ą 1{2. Moreover,
since the half of the elements in C are involutions inverting T, we can construct a
generating set of size Oplog log |F|q for CXpaq.
The map ζ0 is useful when we are interested mostly in involutions in CXrAs, as
it happens, for example, in reification of involutions, see Section 4.8.
4.8. Reification of an involution. We approach the most fascinating part of the
story: identification of an involution in X from its description. We shall call this
procedure the reification of an involution; it is intensively used in the present paper
and in [15].
Following the notation from the previous subsection, assume that A ãÑ XˆX is a
proto-involution on X encrypting a specific inner automorphism of X , conjugation
by an involution a P X . We want to find a string a in X that encrypts a. Let
A ă X ˆ X be the graph of conjugation by a. Obviously, a P Y “ CX rAs, and,
moreover, a P ZpY q. Denote by ΩpY q the subgroup generated by all involutions
in ZpY q, then a P ΩpY q. Even more so, a probabilistic algorithm described in
Section 4.7 gives us a black box group Y “ CXrAs encrypting Y . Now we apply to
the subgroup (unknown to us) ΩpY q the algorithm proving the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Assume that a black box group Y encrypts a subgroup Y in a simple
group X of Lie type of odd characteristic and of Lie rank n. Assume also that
we know a global exponent E for Y. Then there is a Las Vegas algorithm which
constructs a black box group W ãÑ Y which encrypts an elementary abelian 2-group
W ď Y which contains ΩpY q. The algorithm works in probabilistic time polynomial
in lpYq, logE (the global exponent of Y), and n.
Proof. Let i1 be an involution produced from a random element in Y by repeated
square and multiply method. Then Y1 “ CYpi1q is a black box subgroup encrypting
a subgroup Y1 ď Y containing ΩpY q. Now, let i2 be a string encrypting an involution
different from i1 produced by Y1, then similarly Y2 “ CY1pi2q is a black box subgroup
encrypting a subgroup Y2 ď Y1 containing ΩpY q. Continuing in this way, we
descend to a black box subgroup Z ãÑ Y encrypting an abelian group Z containing
ΩpY q. Now, by using the black box group Z, we construct the involutions in Z as
14 ALEXANDRE BOROVIK AND S¸U¨KRU¨ YALC¸INKAYA
described in Section 4.7. Finally, we use these involutions and bounds from [38,
pp. 192–193] to construct a generating set in a black box subgroup W ãÑ Y which
encrypts an elementary abelian subgroup containing ΩpY q.
If X is a simple group of Lie type of odd characteristic, then the length of chains
of centralizers of involutions is bounded by a polynomial in its Lie rank, giving a
crude upper bound of log |X |. Since elements of even order (hence involutions) in
X are abundant by [27] and the number of involutions in ZpY q is bounded by a
polynomial in the Lie rank of X , the process quickly produces a desired black box
subgroup W ãÑ Y. 
Since a is a string which encrypts an involution in an elementary abelian group in
ZpY q, it belongs to an elementary abelian groupW constructed in Lemma 4.3; after
that, a can be identified by testing every possibility in W. These crude estimates
show that the reification procedure works in probabilistic time polynomial in lpXq,
logE (where E is the global exponent of X) and |W |.
In this paper, reification of involutions is applied to SO3pFq in odd characteristic.
In this case, centralizers of involutions at the subsequent stages of the algorithm
are either dihedral or abelian, and the black box subgroup W in the statement of
Lemma 4.3 has order at most 4. Hence the procedure, in this case, is pretty fast.
4.9. Involutions in PSL2p2nq. Let X be a black box group encrypting PSL2p2nq
for some n ě 2. A paper by Kantor and Kassabov [28] contains a construction of
an involution in X, a result analogous to the results in this paper. We shall now
show how involutions in PSL2p2nq can be constructed by our methods.
Take two non-commuting elements x and y of odd order. It is a well-known
property of SL2p2nq that either x and y belong to the same Borel subgroup in X –
but in that case rx, ys is an involution, and we are done, or there is an involution
a P X which inverts both x and y. We do not know a, but it is obvious that the
proto-involution A ă Xˆ X corresponding to a contains the tuple
ppxyqa, xyq “ pxaya, xyq “ px´1y´1, xyq.
Now it follows from Equation (2) that
ζ1ppx´1y´1, xyqq “
a
xy2x ¨ x´1y´1.
It is easy to see that the calculation produces an involution in CXpAq unless xy2x is
already an involution.
5. Applications of reifications of involutions
5.1. Construction of SO3pFq from PSL2pFq. It will become clear later in this
paper that black box groups PGL2pFq – SO3pFq are easier to analyze than SL2pFq
or PSL2pFq because they contain more involutions. We extend a black box group
encrypting PSL2pFq to a black box group encrypting SO3pFq using amalgamation
of proto-automorphisms, Theorem 4.1, and augmentation of a black box group by
a proto-involution, Theorem 4.2.
If x P X is a non-trivial semisimple element, then we will denote the maximal
torus in X containing x by Tx.
Theorem 5.1. Let Y be a black box group encrypting a group Y “ PSL2pFq, where
F is an unknown finite field of unknown odd characteristic and |F| ě 7. Assume that
we know a global exponent E for Y. Then there is an algorithm which constructs
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a proto-involution Y˝ ãÑ Y ˆ Y on Y encrypting a diagonal automorphism d of Y .
Moreover, if we take the automorphism
d : px, x1q ÞÑ px1, xq for px, x1q P Y˝
of Y˝, then the semidirect product X “ Y˝ ¸ xdy is a black box group encrypting
PGL2pFq.
The running time of the algorithm is polynomial in logE.
Proof. We recall that Y has one conjugacy class of external involutive diagonal
automorphisms [24, Table 4.5.1]. Let d be its representative, then CY pdq “ S¸xwy
where S is a torus in Y of order p|F|´1q{2 or p|F|`1q{2 depending on |F| ” ´1 mod 4
or |F| ” 1 mod 4, respectively, and w is an involution inverting S. Observe that
the order of the torus S is odd. Take an involution t P CY pdq inverting S and
assume that t is contained in some maximal torus T . By the Frattini argument,
Y ¨NY xdypT q “ Y xdy and we can assume without loss of generality that d normalizes
T .
Notice that xT, Sy “ Y and d centralizes S and inverts every element in T .
Therefore we can apply to Y amalgamation of proto-automorphisms and augmen-
tation by a proto-involution, Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2.
Construction of tori T and S in Y with these properties goes as follows. We first
construct an involution u P Y and its centralizer CYpuq “ Tu ¸ xwy. Then, we find
a random element y P Y such that the element z :“ uuy has odd order and set
S :“ xzy. A black box for Tu can be set up (or a generating set for Tu can be found)
by the arguments in Subsection 4.7. It follows from the well-known description of
subgroups in PSL2pFq that the subgroups Tu and S generate Y.
Consider the amalgam of local proto-automorphisms
α : Tu Ñ Tu, t ÞÑ t´1
β : SÑ S, s ÞÑ s
and let Y˝ be the resulting involutive proto-automorphism of Y. Note that the
automorphism d : px, x1q ÞÑ px1, xq of Y˝ defined by the rule as in Theorem 4.2, so
the black box group Y˝ ¸ xdy encrypts Y ¸ xdy. All we need to do now is to make
sure that the automorphism d encrypts an external involutive automorphism of Y .
Observe that if the element z belongs to a maximal torus of odd order in Y,
then d encrypts an external involutive diagonal automorphism of Y . However, if
the element z belongs to a maximal torus of even order in Y, then d must be the
involution in this torus since d centralizes S. Therefore, d encrypts some inner
automorphism of Y and we can construct the involution d in Y as a string by
constructing the central involution in CYpdq. In this case, we reconstruct a random
element y P Y and repeat our procedure as above. Note that the probability of
finding an element y P Y such that the element z :“ uuy belongs to a maximal torus
of odd order is at least 1{2. 
5.2. Reification of involutions in SO3pFq. Reification of proto-involutions, as
described in Section 4.8, is the most important procedure involved in our construc-
tion of unipotent elements in SO3pFq and in the proof of Theorem 1.3.
We list some well-known properties of the group X » SO3pFq » PGL2pFq.
Lemma 5.2. Let X » SO3pFq » PGL2pFq where F is a field of odd characteristic.
Then:
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‚ Every non-trivial element in X is either semisimple or unipotent.
‚ Every non-trivial semisimple element z P X belongs to a unique torus Z ă
X and centralizes an involution r P Z.
‚ If s and t are distinct involutions in X and z “ st is a semisimple element,
the involution r in the torus Z containing z is the only involution in X
which commutes with both s and t.
For two distinct involutions s, t P X, we denote the only involution in X that
commutes with both s and t, if such involution exists, as s b t. If it does not exist,
then, in view of Lemma 5.2, the product st is a unipotent element.
Theorem 5.3. Let X be a black box group encrypting X “ SO3pFq, where F is an
unknown finite field of unknown odd characteristic. Assume that |F| ě 7 and we
know a global exponent E for X. Let s, t P X be two distinct involutions such that st
is not a unipotent element. Then there is a Las Vegas algorithm constructing the
involution j commuting with s and t.
The running time of the algorithm is polynomial in logE.
We shall write j “ s b t, treating b as a partial binary operation on the set of
involutions and call it cross product.
Proof. We set z :“ st. Note first that if |z| “ 2, then s and t commute and z is
an involution commuting with them. If |z| ą 2, CXpπXpzqq is a torus containing an
involution πXpjq and it is inverted by πXpsq and πXptq. Clearly, j commutes with s
and t. By Lemma 5.2, such an involution j is unique in X.
If the order of z is even, then j “ ipzq, see Section 4.7.
If z has odd order, then observe that j centralizes Z “ xzy and inverts every
element in the torus Ts containing s; construction of Ts is similar to construction
of tori in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Since the order of z is odd, we have |Z| ě 3
and so X “ xTs,Zy. Now the involution j can be found by amalgamating local
proto-automorphisms
x ÞÑ x´1 on Ts
x ÞÑ x on Z
and reifying the result, see Section 4.8. In X “ SO3pFq where F is a finite field of
odd characteristic with |F| ě 7, the last step can be run very efficiently due to the
fact that involutions r P X have the property that ZpCXprqq “ xry, see details in
Section 4.8. 
5.3. Writing an element in SO3pFq as a product of two involutions. It is
well-known that any element of order ą 2 in SO3pFq, where F is a finite field of odd
characteristic, can be writen as a product of two involutions. The following lemma
shows the same can be done in black box groups.
Lemma 5.4. Let X be a black box group encrypting SO3pFq, where F is a finite
field of unknown odd characteristic and |F| ě 7. Then, with a given global exponent
E for X, we can represent an arbitrary element x P X of order |x| ą 2 as a product
of two involutions r and s from X in time polynomial in logE. In particular, this
yields an involution r inverting x. This algorithm is Las Vegas.
Proof. We take a random element y P X. By [25], the probability that X is generated
by x and y is at least 1´ 1
2|F|2`2 . Now, we reify the involution r that inverts x and
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y. If we end up with a failure or a serendipitous discovery of a unipotent element,
we need to repeat reification with other choice of y. When we have the involution
r, we can decompose x “ r ¨ rx, where both r and s “ rx are involutions. 
5.4. Unipotency test. The following lemma makes the algorithm in Theorem 1.1
Las Vegas.
Lemma 5.5. Assume that X encrypts SO3pFq where F is an unknown finite field
of unknown odd characteristic with |F| ě 7. Let u P X of order bigger than 2 and r
an involution inverting u – the latter can be found by Lemma 5.4.
(a) Take a random element 1 ‰ t P CXprq with |t| ě 3. Then u is unipotent if
and only if u ‰ ut and ru, uts “ 1.
(b) Assume that u is unipotent. Then U “ xuTry is the maximal unipotent
subgroup in X containing u, s inverts U, and B “ UTr is the Borel subgroup
containing U.
The algorithms in this Lemma run in probabilistic time polynomial in logE.
Proof. To prove (a), observe that since |t| ě 3, t belongs to the torus Tr. Note
that the elements of X are either semisimple or unipotent. If u is semisimple, then
CXpuq is the torus Tu. Since ru, uts “ 1 and u P Tu, we have ut P Tu. Hence
t P NXpTuq “ Tu ¸ xwy for some involution w inverting Tu. Since |t| ě 3, we
conclude that t P Tu. This is a contradiction to the assumption u ‰ ut. Hence u is
a unipotent element in X.
If u is unipotent, then part (b) immediately follows from the structural facts
about the groups SO3pFq in odd characteristic and also provides the reverse impli-
cation in (a).
By the arguments in Section 4.7, the black box for the subgroup Tr allows us
to construct random conjugates of u by the random elements of Tr. Hence we can
construct random elements from U and B. 
5.5. Bisection of angles. Note that bisection of angles is the extraction of square
roots in the group of rotations. In our setting, Axiom BB4 allows us to find square
roots of elements in cyclic black box subgroups by virtue of the Tonelli-Shanks
algorithm [39, 40]. Usually the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm is formulated only for
multiplicative groups of finite fields and we include its more general formulation for
completeness of exposition.
Lemma 5.6 (The Tonelli-Shanks Algorithm). Let T be a cyclic black box group of
known global exponent E. Let z be an element in T that has a square root in T.
Then an element t P T such that t2 “ z can be found in probabilistic polynomial
time in logE.
Proof. We set E “ 2mn where p2, nq “ 1. Given t P T, we shall say that l is the
2-height of t, if |tn| “ 2l; notice that this is equivalent to 2l being the largest power
of 2 that divides the order |t| of t.
We first construct an element x P T with maximal 2-height l, that is, the order
|x| is divisible by the maximum power of 2 dividing the order of T. To do this, we
construct a constant number of random elements in T and take the element with
the biggest 2-height. Note that since T is cyclic, at least half of the elements of T
have orders with maximal 2-height. If a chosen element does not have the biggest
2-height, then the procedure below fails, and we start our procedure by constructing
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an element with bigger 2-height. Let x P T be an element with maximal 2-height
l, that is, the order x is divisible by the maximum power of 2 dividing the order of
T. If l ‰ 0, then x can not be a square in T, namely, there are no elements y P T
such that y2 “ x. We set
a :“ zpn`1q{2, b :“ zn, c :“ xn.
Note that if b “ 1, then z has odd order and the element a is the desired square
root of z. If b ‰ 1, then we run the loop:
‚ Find the smallest non-negative integer d such that b2d “ 1.
‚ If d ą 0 then repeat until d “ 0:
Set a :“ ac2l´d´1, b :“ bc2l´d, c :“ c2l´d , l :“ d.
‚ When d “ 0, the element a is the desired square root of z.

Lemma 5.7. Let X be a black box group encrypting SO3pFq, where F is an unknown
finite field of unknown odd characteristic. Assume that |F| ě 7 and i, j P X are two
conjugate involutions. Then, given an exponent E for X, we can find an involution
x P X such that ix “ j in time polynomial in logE.
Proof. We set E “ 2mn where p2, nq “ 1, and set z “ ij.
If the order of z is odd, that is, zn “ 1 then notice that izpn`1q{2 “ j. Now,
zpn`1q{2j is an involution conjugating i to j.
Assume now that the order of z is even and k “ ipzq is the involution in xzy, see
Section 4.7. We denote by Y the subgroup in X encrypting PSL2pFq; it is well-known
that |X : Y| “ 2 and Y Ÿ X.
Let T be the maximal torus in X containing k and T2 “ tt2 | t P Tu, then T2 is
the subgroup of index 2 in T and T2 “ T X Y. Observe that z “ ij P T2 because i
and j, being conjugate, simultaneously belong or do not belong to Y.
We can now apply the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm for cyclic groups, Lemma 5.6,
and find t P T such that t2 “ z “ ij; after that we have
itj “ jt´1itj “ jt´1jjitj “ tjitj “ t2jij “ j,
and x “ tj is an involution since j inverts t P T. 
6. Geometry of involutions in PGL2pFq » SO3pFq
LetX “ PGL2pFq » SO3pFq, where F is a finite field of odd characteristic. In this
section, we see that actions of involutions from X control properties of every facet
of the structure of the group and its Lie algebra. Involutions are multifunctional:
they act as pointers to tori in the group X , to toric subalgebras in the Lie algebra
l “ LiepXq of X , to points and to lines in the projective plane associated with l as
F-vector space, and they control the canonical polarity on P .
6.1. The Lie algebra. Let M be the 2ˆ 2 matrix algebra over F. We denote the
elements of M by lower case Greek letters.
The Lie algebra l “ sl2pFq of the group X “ PGL2pFq » SO3pFq is the vector
space of 2 ˆ 2 matrices of trace 0 with the Lie bracket rα, βs “ αβ ´ βα and the
Killing form Kpα, βq “ Trpαβq. The isomorphism PGL2pFq » SO3pFq comes from
the adjoint action of GL2pFq on the Lie algebra l, that is, action by conjugation
on l. The group PGL2pFq is the image of this action and becomes the group of
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automorphisms of l. Therefore it preserves the Killing form K on l, moreover, it
coincides with the orthogonal group SO3pl,Kq.
The following property of matrices in M can be easily checked.
Lemma 6.1. Let α PM be a non-scalar matrix. Then α2 is a scalar matrix if and
only if Trpαq “ 0.
Similarly, the following properties of l “ sl2pFq can also be easily proven.
Lemma 6.2. Let α, β P l, that is, Trpαq “ Trpβq “ 0.
(a) α is either non-degenerate and semisimple or α2 “ 0.
(b) Trpα2q “ ´ detα. As a consequence, Trpα2q “ 0 if and only if α2 “ 0.
(c) rα, βs “ 0 if and only if α and β are collinear, that is, one of them is a
scalar multiple of another one.
(d) Trpα, rα, βsq “ 0.
6.2. Projectivization of the Lie algebra: polarity. Now consider the projec-
tive space PpMq associated with the vector space M and the natural map
ω :M r t0u ÝÑ PpMq.
Notice that X “ PGL2pFq is the image of GL2pFq under this map.
Denote by P “ ωplq the image of l in PpMq; it is a projective plane with polarity
π induced by the Killing form on l. It follows from Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2(a) that I “
PXX is the set of involutions inX . By Lemma 6.2(b), the setQ “ PrI is a quadric
in P determined by the quadratic form Trpα2q (“ ´ detα by Lemma 6.2(b)).
The group X has a natural action on PpMq induced by the action of GL2pFq on
M by conjugation.
Obviously, X leaves invariant the projective plane P and its subsets I and Q.
Moreover X acts on P by collineations and preserves the polarity π.
There are two kinds of points in P :
‚ involutive (or toric, or semisimple, or regular) – they form the set I;
‚ unipotent (or parabolic, or tangent) – they are points on the quadric Q.
We shall call I the involution plane; it is a projective plane with a polarity, but
with points of the corresponding quadric removed.
For points a, b P P we shall write a K b if a P πpbq (which is equivalent to
b P πpaq). If α, β P l are matrices representing a and b, respectively, then a K b is
the same as Kpα, βq “ Trpαβq “ 0.
Notice also that
Q “ t a P P : a P πpaq u.
6.3. Projectivization of the Lie algebra: cross product. The Lie product
r , s on l induces a partial binary operation on the plane P : namely, if a and b are
distinct points in P represented by matrices α, β P l, respectively, then, in view of
Lemma 6.2(c), rα, βs ‰ 0 and ωprα, βsq is defined as in Section 6.2 and does not
depend on choice of α and β. We denote
ωprα, βsq “ a b b
and call it the cross product of a and b. Obviously, ab b “ bba. The cross product
has an obvious connection with the polarity:
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Lemma 6.3. If a and b are distinct points in P then
a K a b b and b K a b b,
and, consequently,
a b b “ πpaq ^ πpbq
is the point of intersection of the polar lines of a and b.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 6.2(d). 
Notice that action of X on P preserves the cross product. We use the term
“cross product” and notation b to emphasize the analogy with the cross product
of vectors in R3, that is, the Lie algebra operation in the Lie algebra of SO3pRq,
the group of rotations of the 3-dimensional Euclidean space.
The projective plane P with polarity and cross product is a combinatorial object
that retains essential properties of the Lie algebra l “ sl2; we shall call it the projec-
tivization of l. As we shall soon see, polarity and cross product can be constructed
inside of the group X : first on the set I of involutions and then extended to the
whole plane P by interpreting the points of the quadric Q as maximal unipotent
subgroups of X . Moreover, these constructions can be carried out in a black box
group X encrypting X .
6.4. Points. Now we turn our attention to involutions in X which will serve as
points in our projective plane.
In view of Lemma 6.2(b), a vector σ P l is semisimple in the Lie algebra sense
if and only if Kpσ, σq ‰ 0 (that is, σ is regular in the terminology of the theory of
quadratic forms) and nilpotent if and only if Kpσ, σq “ 0 (that is, σ is singular).
Every semisimple element σ in l gives rise to an involution in X , the half-turn sσ
around the one-dimensional vector subspace (it is also a Lie subalgebra) generated
by σ:
(3) sσ : α ÞÑ 2Kpα, σq
Kpσ, σq σ ´ α.
Observe that the half-turn sσ is not changed if we replace σ by a non-zero scalar
multiple cσ.
Lemma 6.4. An involution s “ ωpσq in X represented by a matrix σ is the half-
turn around σ:
ωpσq “ sσ.
Proof. Indeed, in its adjoint action on l, every involution s from X has eigenvalues
`1,´1,´1. If s “ ωpσq then obviously σs “ σ is an eigenvector for s and eigenvalue
`1. Obviously this means that then s “ sσ. 
Denote the `1-eigenspace (the axis of the half-turn) s as ts. Obviously, ts is a
1-dimensional regular subspace of l and thus a Cartan subalgebra of l. If Ts is a
torus in X containing s then ts “ LiepTsq, the Lie algebra of Ts.
Lemma 6.5. Let i, j P I and i ‰ j, then i K j if and only if ij “ ji.
Proof. By Lemma 6.4, i and j are half-turns. Now it easily follows from Equation
3 in Section 6.4 that they commute if and only if their axes are orthogonal, that is,
if and only if i K j. 
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Lemma 6.5 allows us to interpret the polarity restricted to the involution plane
I within the group X :
Lemma 6.6. If i P I then
πpiq X I “ t j P I | ij “ ji and i ‰ j u.
We shall denote
πIpiq “ πpiq X I.
Similarly, we have the following result for the cross product:
Lemma 6.7. If i, j P I are distinct involutions and k “ i b j P I then
k “ πpiq ^ πpjq
is the only involution in X which commutes with the both i and j.
Later in the paper, we shall extend the polarity and cross product to the whole
projective plane P “ I YQ.
6.5. Lines. For every involution s P I, its polar image πpsq in P can be described
by taking its intersection with I: πIpsq “ πpsqX I. It could happen that one or two
points in πpsq XQ are missing from πIpsq. Set q “ |F|. The centralizer C “ CXpsq
is a dihedral group of order 2pq ˘ 1q which contains the maximal torus Ts of order
q ˘ 1 inverted by q ˘ 1 involutions in the coset C r Ts; these involutions commute
with s and therefore
πIpsq “ C r Ts.
As we shall see in the next section, there are more lines on P .
6.6. The Weisfeiler plane. Every 1-dimensional subspace a in l is a Lie subalge-
bra of l and coincides with the Lie algebra LiepAq of some 1-dimensional algebraic
subgroup A ă X . Assuming that |F| “ q, the latter belongs to one of the three
conjugacy classes:
‚ non-split tori: cyclic subgroups of order q ` 1,
‚ maximal unipotent subgroups of order q,
‚ split tori: cyclic subgroups of order q ´ 1,
see the paper by Boris Weisfeiler [41].
Therefore the setW of 1-dimensional algebraic subgroups A in X is in one-to-one
correspondence
AØ LiepAq
with the set of 1-dimensional Lie subalgebras of l and can be treated as a projective
plane; we shall call the Weisfeiler plane and denote it by W .
It will be convenient to identify W with the dual plane P˚ of P and treat points
of W as lines of P . For that we need to describe the incidence relation between
points and lines.
If A is 1-dimensional subgroup in X , the line ℓpAq associated with it contains
(incident with) all involutions inverting A; if w is one of these involutions then
ℓI “ ℓpAq X I coincides with the coset Aw.
‚ If A is a non-split torus, all q ` 1 points in ℓpAq are involutions.
‚ If A is a maximal unipotent subgroup, q points in ℓpAq are involutions in
the Borel subgroup NXpAq inverting A, and the additional parabolic point
in ℓpAq X C is ωpLiepAqq for A itself.
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‚ If A is a split torus, q ´ 1 points in ℓpAq are involutions inverting A; two
additional parabolic points in ℓpAq X Q are ωpLiepUqq and ωpLiepV qq for
two maximal unipotent subgroups U and V normalized by A.
These three types of lines are called hyperbolic, parabolic, and elliptic, respec-
tively. The parabolic lines are tangent lines to Q, that is, lines having exactly one
point with Q in common. In I, a parabolic line appears as the coset Ut of a max-
imal unipotent subgroup U in X with respect to an involution t inverting every
element in U .
7. The black box projective plane and projectivization of the Lie
algebra
Let X be a black box group encrypting X “ PGL2pFq » SO3pFq where F is a
finite field of odd characteristic and |F| ě 7.
Using the black box X as a computational engine, we shall construct a black box
projective plane P that encrypts the projective plane P discussed in Section 6.
The elements or objects of P are points and lines.
7.1. Points. There are two types of points in P; regular and parabolic.
A regular point is an involution in X; I is the set of all involutions in X. To
produce a random regular point, we construct an involution from a random element
in X by repeated square and multiply method and conjugate it by a random element.
Note that a random element in X has even order with probability at least 1/4 [27].
A parabolic point a black box for a maximal unipotent subgroup U ă X; it is a
point on the quadric Q “ PrI; to construct one is the principal aim of the paper.
7.2. Lines. There are two types of lines in P; toric and parabolic.
A toric or regular line l is a black box for a subgroup T ¸ xwy where T ă X is
a torus and w P X is an involution that inverts every element in T. A toric line is
incident to the following points:
‚ If |T| “ q` 1 then l is incident only to points represented by involutions in
the coset Tw;
‚ If |T| “ q ´ 1 then l is incident to q ´ 1 points represented by involu-
tions in the coset Tw and, in addition, two parabolic points which will
be constructed later and correspond to two maximal unipotent subgroups
normalized by T.
It is convenient to specify a toric line using its polar image, that is, the involution
in the torus T.
A parabolic line (or tangent line) u is a black box for a subgroup U¸ xty where
U ă X is a maximal unipotent subgroup and t P X is an involution inverting every
element in U – it exists and can be computed by Lemma 5.5(b). The line u is
incident to two kinds of points:
‚ q regular points, involutions in the coset Ut; and
‚ U itself, seen as a point.
7.3. Cross product on I and a serendipity construction of a unipotent
element. As we can see, we have immediate access only to points in I, that is,
involutions in X. Our principal tool is the cross product provided by Theorem 5.3.
In view of Lemma 6.7, the operation b on I encrypts the cross product on I.
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For large q, the probability of hitting a unipotent element u by taking product
of two random involutions s and t is O p1{qq, as can be seen from the following
argument. Indeed, note that the number of involutions in X is q2 where q “ |F|
and for a fixed involution s, there are at most two unipotent subgroups normalized
by s. Therefore, the number of unipotent elements of the form ssx, x P X, is at
most 2pq´1q. Therefore, the probability of this event is approximately O p1{qq and
becomes astronomically small for a large field F.
However if it happens by a sheer strike of luck, we get a unipotent element u “ st
and a black box for the parabolic subgroup
B “ xuTsy ¸ Ts,
its maximal unipotent subgroup
U “ xuTsy,
(that is, a parabolic point) and the set Us of regular points in the corresponding
parabolic line, see Lemma 5.5.
Combining Theorem 5.3 with the arguments above, we have
Theorem 7.1. There is probabilistic polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm which,
given two involutions i, j P I, constructs either
‚ an involution i b j, or
‚ a black box subgroup U ¸ xiy “ U ¸ xjy where U is a maximal unipotent
subgroup in X inverted by i and j. The black box for U represents a parabolic
point in P which coincides with i b j in sense of Section 6.3.
The strategy of our proof of Theorem 1.1 is to carry out a polynomial time
chain of constructions in I which will force the serendipity moment, that is, the
second bullet point in Theorem 7.1. In the next section, we shall describe tools for
computations in I needed for that purpose.
7.4. A toolbox for the involution plane I. Constructions in this section are
conditional on assumption that s b t P I is an involution for all involutions s and
t that we encounter in our calculations – as it was explained in Section 7.3, this is
what normally happens with very high probability.
We shall expand our algorithms to the whole black box projective plane P in
Section 7.5.
7.4.1. Polar image of a point in I. Let q “ |F|.
Let t be an involution and Tt a torus containing it, and w an involution inverting
Tt.
‚ If |Tt| “ q ` 1 then the polar line piptq is the coset Ttw, with random
points in it generated in an obvious way with the help of a black box for
Tt ă CXptq.
‚ If |Tt| “ q ´ 1 then the polar line piptq is the coset Ttw together with two
points represented by black boxes for maximal unipotent subgroups U and
V normalized by Tt. At this stage we do not know how to construct U
and V, but it will become clear after Theorem 1.1 is proven: we take a
nontrivial unipotent element u, construct the maximal unipotent subgroup
A and an involution s inverting A as in Lemma 5.5, and then construct an
element x conjugating the involution sx “ t. Now Tt normalizes U “ Ax,
and if r P CXptqr Tt then Tt normalizes Ur “ V as well.
24 ALEXANDRE BOROVIK AND S¸U¨KRU¨ YALC¸INKAYA
7.4.2. Polar image of a line in I. Let k be a line in P. Given a line, we can always
find on it two distinct regular points, see Section 7.2; take points a ‰ b on k. Then
pipkq “ a b b.
7.4.3. A line through two regular points. If s, t P I then the line s_ t through s and
t is
s_ t “ pips b tq.
We shall note here that we do not list the points on the black box projective
lines but we produce random elements on them when they are needed.
7.4.4. Intersection of two lines in I. If two lines k and l intersect in I, their inter-
section point k^ l can be found as
k^ l “ pi ppipkq _ piplqq .
7.5. Expansion of the toolbox from I to P.
7.5.1. Polarity in P. If U is a maximal unipotent subgroup in X seen as a parabolic
point and t an involution inverting U which can be constructed by Lemmas 5.4 and
5.5, then pipUq is the tangent line UtY tUu through U.
7.5.2. Intersection of two lines. Since we have now polarity in P, the formula is
the same as in 7.4.4.
7.5.3. Cross product in P. For two distinct points s, t P P,
s b t “ pipsq ^ piptq.
7.5.4. A line through parabolic points. Let s be an involution and U a parabolic
point, that is, a maximal unipotent subgroup. Observe that if s inverts U then s
belongs to the line tangent to Q at U. In this case, we have
s_ U “ UY Us.
Assume now that s does not invert U. In this case, the line s_U is the polar line of
the involution r which centralizes s and inverts U. Since r P CXpsq, r inverts every
element in the torus Ts. Therefore, r can be reified from the amalgamation of the
the following proto-morphisms:
Ts Ñ Ts, t ÞÑ t´1
UÑ U, u ÞÑ u´1.
Moreover, since s and U belong to the line s _ U and s does not normalize U, the
other missing point in this line is the unipotent group Us. Hence, in this case, we
have
s_ U “ TrsY tU,Usu.
For the line passing through given two parabolic points U and V, we follow the
similar procedure as above. Note that, in this case, the line U_ V is the polar line
of the involution r which inverts both U and V. Therefore, r can be reified similarly
and
U_ V “ Trw Y tU,Vu
for some w P CXprq inverting Tr.
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8. Construction of Sym4
It is well-known that there is only one conjugacy class of subgroups isomorphic to
Sym4 in SO3pFq over a finite field of odd characteristic. The fundamental procedure
in the coordinatization of P is the construction of a black box subgroup encrypting
Sym4 in a black box group encrypting SO3pFq over a finite field of odd characteristic.
As we shall soon see, a subgroup isomorphic to Sym4 provides us with a convenient
basis triangle in P.
Theorem 8.1. Let X be a black box group encrypting X “ SO3pFq over an un-
known finite field F of unknown odd characteristic and |F| ě 7. Then, given a
global exponent E for X, there is a polynomial in logE time Las Vegas algorithm
constructing a black box subgroup in X which encrypts a subgroup in X isomorphic
to Sym4.
We precede our proof of Theorem 8.1 with a few lemmas. We work within
the terminological conventions of Section 4.2 and apply to strings and black box
subgroups of X the same terms as to corresponding elements and subgroups of X .
We work under assumptions of Theorem 8.1. It is well-known that X has two
conjugacy classes of involutions. We say that an involution is of `-type if the order
of its centralizer is 2pq ´ 1q and ´-type if the order of its centralizer is 2pq ` 1q.
Notice that CXpiq “ Ti ¸ xwy where Ti is a torus of order pq ˘ 1q and w is an
involution inverting Ti. We will consider the involutions of `-type if q ” 1 mod 4
and ´-type if q ” ´1 mod 4 so that the order of the corresponding torus is always
divisible by 4; we will call them involutions of right type.
We are looking for a 5-tuple
pi, j, z, s,Tiq
where i P X is an involution of right type, j P X is an involution of right type
which inverts Ti, z P X is an element of order 3 normalizing xi, jy and s P Ti is an
element of order 4. We also set k “ ij and note that k is also of right type. Clearly
xi, j, zy encrypts a subgroup isomorphic to Alt4 and xi, j, z, sy encrypts Sym4. The
crucial part of our construction is the search an element z P X of order 3 permuting
some mutually commuting involutions i, j, k P X of right type. The following lemma
provides explicit construction of such an element.
Lemma 8.2. Let i, j, k P X be mutually commuting involutions of right type and
x P X be an arbitrary element. Assume that y1 “ ijx has odd order m1 and set
n1 “ y
m1`1
2
1 and s “ kxn
´1
1 . Assume also that y2 “ js has odd order m2 and set
n2 “ y
m2`1
2
2 . Then the element z “ xn´11 n´12 permutes i, j, k, and z has order 3.
Proof. Observe first that in1 “ jx and jn2 “ s. Since s “ kxn´11 , we have jn2 “ kxn´11 .
Hence j “ kxn´11 n´12 “ kz. Now, we prove that jz “ i. Since jxn´11 “ i, we have
jz “ jxn´11 n´12 “ in´12 . We claim that y2 P CXpiq, which implies that n2 P CXpiq, so
jz “ in´12 “ i. Now, since j P CXpiq, y2 “ js P CXpiq if and only if s “ kxn´11 P CXpiq.
Moreover, since in1 “ jx, s P CXpiq if and only if kx P CXpjxq, equivalently, k P CXpjq
and the claim follows. It is now clear that iz “ k since ij “ k, and z has order 3. 
Lemma 8.3. Let X, i, j, k, y1, y2 and z be as in Lemma 8.2. Then the probability
that y1 and y2 have odd orders is bounded from below by
1
2
´ 1
2|F| .
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Proof. We first note that the subgroup xi, zy – Alt4 is a subgroup of Y ď X where
Y – PSL2pFq, so the involutions i, j, k belong to a normal subgroup isomorphic to
PSL2pFq. Therefore it is enough to compute the estimate in Y. Notice that all
involutions in Y are conjugate. Therefore the probability that y1 and y2 have odd
orders is the same as the probability of the product of two random involutions from
Y to be of odd order.
The rest of computation is done in the underlying group Y “ πpYq. We set
|F| “ q and we denote by a one of these numbers pq ˘ 1q{2 which is odd and by b
the other one. Then |Y | “ qpq2 ´ 1q{2 “ 2abq and |CY piq| “ 2b for any involution
i P Y . Hence the total number of involutions is
|Y |
|CY piq| “
2abq
2b
“ aq.
Now we compute the number of pairs of involutions pi, jq such that their product
ij belongs to a torus of order a. Let T be a torus of order a. Then NY pT q
is a dihedral group of order 2a. Therefore the involutions in NY pT q form the
coset NY pT qzT since a is odd. Hence, for every torus of order a, we have a2
pairs of involutions whose product belong to T . The number of tori of order a
is |Y |{|NY pT q| “ 2abq{2a “ bq. Hence, there are bqa2 pairs of involutions whose
product belong to a torus of order a. Thus the desired probability is
bqa2
paqq2 “
b
q
ě q ´ 1
2q
“ 1
2
´ 1
2q
.

Proof of Theorem 8.1. Let E “ 2mn where p2, nq “ 1. We first construct an in-
volution i P X of right type and an element s P CXpiq of order 4. Let i P X be an
involution constructed from a random element by taking its power using square-
and-multiply method. To check whether i is an involution of right type or not, we
search for an element s P C :“ CXpiq of order 4. Note that a random element from
C can be constructed efficiently by the arguments in Section 4.7. Note also that if i
is of right type then C contains elements of order 4, otherwise, C does not contain
elements of order 4. If i is of right type then, since C “ Ti¸xwy, where Ti is a torus
of order q˘1 and w is an involution which inverts Ti, a random element from C has
order divisible by 4 with probability at least 1{4. As soon as we find an element
y P C such that yn ‰ 1 and y2n ‰ 1, then we construct an element s P xyy of order
4 by repeated square-and-multiple method. If we can not find an element of order
4 in C, we deduce that i is not of right type and we start from the beginning.
Let i P X be a right type involution. The coset Tiw of Ti in C consists of the
involutions inverting Ti, so half of the elements of C are the involutions inverting
Ti and half of the involutions in Tiw are of the same type as i. We construct an
involution j P C and check whether j is an involution of right type by following the
same arguments above.
Finally, for commuting right type involutions i, j P X, we construct an element z
of order 3 normalizing xi, jy by using Lemma 8.2. The probability of constructing
such an element z P X is at least 1
2
´ 1
2|F| by Lemma 8.3. Hence xs, zy is a black box
subgroup encrypting Sym4. 
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9. Coordinatization and a construction of a black box field
To construct a black box field in X, all we need is to carry out Hilbert’s coordi-
natization of P [26] using our toolbox from Section 7.
9.1. The spinor basis. A construction from Section 8 yields a black box subgroup
H encrypting Sym4 and we shall need to introduce special notation for some of its
elements as they will play the central role in later calculations.
We denote the three involutions in the 4-group E “ O2pHq by e1, e2, e3. If
t1, t2, t3 are the centralizers in the Lie algebra l of their images πpe1q, πpe2q, πpe3q,
respectively, we know that they are orthogonal to each other and
l “ t1 ‘ t2 ‘ t3
is the weight decomposition for the action of E on l and is therefore a grading of l:
rt1, t2s “ t3, rt2, t3s “ t1, rt3, t1s “ t2.
Moreover, an element z of order 3 from H cyclically permutes t1, t2, t3, which allows
us to select a basis in l made of
ǫ1 P t1, ǫ2 “ ǫz1 P t2, and ǫ3 “ ǫz2 P t3.
Since E lies in the commutator of H, the involutions ei P E have spinor norm 1 and
therefore vectors ǫi can be chosen to satisfy
Kpǫi, ǫiq “ 1
forming an orthonormal basis in l,
Kpǫi, ǫjq “ δij .
In particular, the quadric Q in P can be written by the equation
x21 ` x22 ` x23 “ 0
in the coordinates x1, x2, x3 associated with the basis ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3.
In addition, the basis ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 seen as a basis of the Lie algebra l obviously
satisfies the Lie relations
rǫ1, ǫ2s “ aǫ3, rǫ2, ǫ3s “ aǫ1, rǫ3, ǫ1s “ aǫ2,
for some fixed a P F˚q . What we found is an analogue of a spinor basis (or Pauli
basis) from quantum mechanics and we will discuss these in detail elsewhere.
9.2. First steps towards the coordinatization of P. We know that ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3
form an orthonormal basis in l and e1, e2, e3 have homogeneous coordinates
p1, 0, 0q, p0, 1, 0q, p0, 0, 1q;
and the quadric Q is given in coordinates x1, x2, x3 associated with this basis by the
equation
x21 ` x22 ` x23 “ 0.
Following traditional notation, we represent lines in P by equations of the form
X1x1 ` X2x2 ` X3x3 “ 0
and treat the tuple rX1,X2,X3s as the homogeneous coordinates of the line.
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9.3. First steps in construction of a black box field. We shall now construct
a black box field K. Towards this end, we take the set of points on the line e1 _ e3
for the extended field KYt8u by assigning the coordinate x1 “ 0 to e3 and x1 “ 8
to e1. We call the line e1 _ e3 the x1-axis and similarly the line e2 _ e3 the x2-axis.
Taking into account that the coordinatization of P has to be consistent with the
action of X, and, in particular, with the action of H on the basis e1, e2, e3, we see
that if we take the line e1 _ e2 for the line at infinity, we have the following:
r
r
r✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡❏❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❏
e3 “ p0, 0, 1q e1 “ p8, 0, 1q
e2 “ p0,8, 1q
Here, 0 and 1 can be seen as elements of our future black box field K.
The following is the same picture in homogeneous coordinates:
r
r
r✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡❏❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❏
e3 “ p0, 0, 1q e1 “ p1, 0, 0q
e2 “ p0, 1, 0q
We shall gradually assign coordinates to more and more points in P, at every
step ensuring that the coordinatization is consistent with the action of X on I and
P and hence with the vector space structure on l. If a point x P P has coordinates
x1, x2, x3, we shall write
x “ px1, x2, x3q.
Similarly, we denote lines by their coordinates,
ℓ “ rX1,X2,X3s
which denote the line
ℓ “ t px1, x2, x3q | X1x1 `X2x2 `X3x3 “ 0 u.
We note that px1, x2, x3q and rX1,X2,X3s are homogeneous coordinates, they are
defined up to multiplication by a non-zero scalar.
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Observe that polarity has a very simple meaning in terms of homogeneous coor-
dinates associated with an orthonormal basis:
pippx1, x2, x3qq “ rX1,X2,X3s if and only if X1 “ x1, X2 “ x2, X3 “ x3.
In particular, polar images of the base points ǫi have equations xi “ 0, i “ 1, 2, 3,
and homogeneous coordinates
pipǫ1q “ r1, 0, 0s, pipǫ2q “ r0, 1, 0s, pipǫ3q “ r0, 0, 1s.
So we have, in the black box setup, the following picture.
r
r
r✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡❏❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❏
e3 “ p0, 0, 1q e1 “ p1, 0, 0q
e2 “ p0, 1, 0q
r0, 0, 1s
r0, 1, 0s
r1, 0, 0s
We shall soon add new points to this picture.
9.4. The unity element in K. So far, we know which elements on the x1-axis
represent the point 0 and 8 and now we construct the unity element on the x1-
axis.
Let z be an element of order 3 in H which permutes the basis points e1, e2, e3.
Pick in NHpxzyq an involution d1 which commutes with e1. Observe that E ¸ xd1y
is a dihedral group of order 8 and therefore ed12 “ e3.
Now turn to the use of homogeneous coordinates. Recall that e2 “ p0, 1, 0q and
e3 “ p0, 0, 1q. There are two involutions which conjugate e2 and e3 (see Equation 3
in Section 6.4):
sp0,1,1qpe2q “ sp0,1,1qpp0, 1, 0qq
“ 2p0 ¨ 0` 1 ¨ 1` 1 ¨ 0q
02 ` 12 ` 12 p0, 1, 1q ´ p0, 1, 0q
“ p0, 0, 1q
“ e3
and
sp0,1,´1qpe2q “ sp0,1,´1qpp0, 1, 0qq
“ 2p0 ¨ 0` 1 ¨ 1` p´1q ¨ 0q
02 ` 12 ` 12 p0, 1,´1q ´ p0, 1, 0q
“ p0, 0,´1q
“ e3
We can assign to d1 the coordinates p0, 1, 1q and set
d2 “ dz1 “ p1, 0, 1q and d3 “ dz
2
1 “ p1, 1, 0q.
So we have now a richer picture:
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r
r
r✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡❏❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❏
e3 “ p0, 0, 1q e1 “ p1, 0, 0q
e2 “ p0, 1, 0q
rd3 “ p1, 1, 0q
r
d2 “ p1, 0, 1q
rd1 “ p0, 1, 1q
9.5. More about H. We record for future use that the natural isomorphism
H ÝÑ Sym4,
where Sym4 is seen as the symmetric group of the set t 0, 1, 2, 3 u in notation chosen
in such a way that
e1 ÞÑ p01qp23q z ÞÑ p123q d1 ÞÑ p23q
e2 ÞÑ p02qp13q d2 ÞÑ p13q
e3 ÞÑ p03qp12q d3 ÞÑ p12q
.
In particular,
dd32 “ d1, ed31 “ e2.
9.6. Affine coordinates. Taking, as we have already did, the line e1 _ e2 for the
line at infinity and the lines x2 “ 0 and x1 “ 0 for the coordinate axes, we get
r
r
r✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡❏❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❏
e3 “ p0, 0, 1q e1 “ p8, 0, 1q
e2 “ p0,8, 1q
r
d3 “ p8,8, 1q
r
d2 “ p1, 0, 1q
rd1 “ p0, 1, 1q
Observe that this assignment of coordinates agrees with action by H. In partic-
ular, conjugation by d3 moves the points 0, 1, 8 on the x1-axis to the points 0, 1,
8 on the x2-axis, respectively. Therefore we can treat both coordinate axes as the
two copies of the projective line K Y t8u over the black box field K that we will
construct on the x1-axis.
Now on “this side of infinity”, on the affine plane x3 ‰ 0, the homogeneous
coordinates of arbitrary point x can be written as px1, x2, 1q, where
x1 “ px_ e2q ^ pe1 _ e3q and x2 “ px_ e1q ^ pe2 _ e3q
are projections of x onto the coordinate axes, and we get the classical coordinati-
zation of the affine plane [22]:
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r
r
r❛❛
❛❛
❛❛
❛❛
❛
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡❏❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❏
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄✄r
px1, 0, 1qp0, 0, 1q p8, 0, 1q
p0,8, 1q
rpx1, x2, 1q
rp0, x2, 1q
r
r
r
px1, 0q
r
px1, x2qp0, x2q
p0, 0q
If x lies on the line at infinity x3 “ 0 then we can take any point x1 on the
line e3 _ x, construct its affine coordinates px11, x12, 1q as above and take the triple
px11, x12, 0q for the homogeneous coordinates of x.
9.7. Addition ‘ on K. Now we can introduce the field operations in the usual
way, as shown on the following two diagrams, see Hartshorne [26] for details. We do
this on the x1-axis. Note that the set of points on this axis consists of involutions
in CXpe2q except e2 together with the two parabolic points – the two maximal
unipotent subgroups inverted by e2 – if the involution e2 is of the `-type in the
sense of Section 8.
r ✲
e3 “ p0, 0q
✻
d1 “ p0, 1q r r
c
r
a
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍r
b
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍r
a‘ b
In terms of our toolbox, we first construct
c “ pa_ e2q ^ pd1 _ e1q,
then we construct the point at infinity on the line d1 _ b and denote it 8d1,b:
8d1,b “ pd1 _ bq ^ pe1 _ e2q,
then a ‘ b is the point of intersection of the line c _ d parallel to d1 _ b with the
x1-axis e1 _ e3:
a‘ b “ pc_8d1,bq ^ pe1 _ e3q.
9.8. Multiplication b on K.
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r
e3 “ p0, 0q
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
e3 _ d3
r
d2 “ p1, 0q
c “ p1, 1q r
r
a
d “ pa, aq r
r
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍
b
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍ r
ab b
In terms of our toolbox, we first construct the line x1 “ x2 as e3 _ d3, then the
point c “ p1, 1q as
pe3 _ d3q ^ pd2 _ e2q,
and point d “ pa, aq as
d “ pe3 _ d3q ^ pa_ e2q,
then the point at infinity of the line b_ c as
8b,c “ pb_ cq ^ pe1 _ e2q,
the line through the point d parallel to b_ c as
d_8b,c,
and, finally, the product a b b as the point of intersection of that line with the
x1-axis e1 _ e3:
ab b “ pe1 _ e3q ^ pd_8b,cq.
9.9. Inversion and negation in K. Forming the negative
x ÞÑ a x
and inversion
x ÞÑ xa
on K are much easier to compute than addition and multiplication. Here are two
useful observations.
If x “ pχ, 0, 1q is a point in the x1-axis,
sp0,0,1qpxq “ sp0,0,1qppχ, 0, 1qq
“ 2p0 ¨ χ` 0 ¨ 0` 1 ¨ 1q
02 ` 02 ` 12 p0, 0, 1q ´ pχ, 0, 1q
“ p0, 0, 2q ´ pχ, 0, 1q
“ p´χ, 0, 1q
“ a x
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and
sp1,0,1qpxq “ sp1,0,1qppχ, 0, 1qq
“ 2p1 ¨ χ` 0 ¨ 0` 1 ¨ 1q
12 ` 02 ` 12 p1, 0, 1q ´ pχ, 0, 1q
“ pχ` 1, 0,χ` 1q ´ pχ, 0, 1q
“ p1, 0,χq
“ p1{χ, 0, 1q
“ xa.
Therefore the field operations of taking negative and inversion
x ÞÑ a x, x ÞÑ xa
on K are computable by single conjugations, that is, for a regular point x in pipe2q,
ax “ xe3 and xa “ xd2 .
This completes the construction of the black box field K.
9.10. Square roots in K. Given an element x P K, a number of polynomial time
Las Vegas algorithms allow us to find a square root of x in K, if it exists. In
our context, the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm, Lemma 5.6, is suitable for our purposes
since the multiplicative group K˚ of K is isomorphic to a torus in X and inherits
the global exponent from X.
10. Enforced serendipity: construction of unipotent elements
The aim of this section is to prove Theorem 1.1. We start by presenting a test
which decides whether an element in PGL2pFq » SO3pFq is unipotent or not when
the characteristic of the field F is not known. This allows us to make our algorithm
presented in Theorem 1.1 a Las Vegas algorithm.
We will use the following lemma to locate a unipotent element in X.
Lemma 10.1. Let q ” ´1 mod 4. Then, for random x, y P Fq, ´x2 ´ y2 is a
non-zero quadratic residue with probability 1{2´ 1{2q2.
Proof. By [9, Theorem 10.5.1], for a fixed 0 ‰ c P Fq, the number of solutions of
the equation ´x2 ´ y2 “ c2 is q` 1. Since there are pq ´ 1q{2 non-zero elements in
Fq which are quadratic residue, ´x2 ´ y2 is a quadratic residue with probability
pq ` 1qpq ´ 1q
2q2
“ q
2 ´ 1
2q2
“ 1
2
´ 1
2q2
for random x, y P Fq. Hence the result follows. 
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let Y be a black box group encrypting PSL2pFq over some
unknown field of unknown odd characteristic p. Let E be an exponent for Y and
E “ 2mn, p2, nq “ 1.
First, we construct a black box group X encrypting SO3pFq from the given black
box group Y by using Theorem 5.1. Next, we construct three commuting involutions
e1, e2, e3 in Y which we take for an orthogonal basis in our projective plane and the
starting points for its coordinatization. Then we construct a black box subgroup
H ă X encrypting Sym4 containing e1, e2, e3 (Theorem 8.1). Note that e1, e2, e3,
being involutions in Y, are right type involutions in X in the sense of Section 8.
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Finally, by following the procedures described in Section 9, we have a black box
field K with addition, ‘, and multiplication, b, together with the procedures for
computing multiplicative and additive inverses. Let K be defined on the x1-axis,
that is, the elements of KY t8u are the involutions in the coset
Te2e1 “ Te2e3,
together with two parabolic points – the maximal unipotent subgroups normalized
by e2 – if the involution e2 is of `-type in sense of Section 8, and we choose the
involutions e3 and e1 for the roles of 0 and 8, respectively.
We work in the affine plane x3 “ 1 in P as constructed in Section 9.6 with
coordinates px1, x2, 1q. In these coordinates, the quadratic equation which defines
the conic Q is x21 ‘ x22 ‘ 1 “ 0.
Let d1 and d2 be the unit elements on the x2-axis and x1-axis, respectively,
constructed as described in Subsection 9.4. Let d3 be the unit element that moves
the x1-axis to the x2-axis coordinate-wise, see Subsection 9.6.
Now, we distinguish the cases q ” 1 mod 4 and q ” ´1 mod 4 to construct a
unipotent element in X.
If q ” 1 mod 4, then the coset Te2e3 has q ´ 1 involutions. Therefore, K has
two missing points which are precisely the parabolic points on the x1-axis. Since
the x2-coordinate of any point on x1-axis is 0, in this case, there exists an element
c P K such that c2 ‘ 1 “ 0. This means that, on the x1-axis, the points with the
homogeneous coordinates p˘c, 0, 1q lie on the conic Q so they are parabolic and
the construction of one of these parabolic points gives a unipotent element in the
black box group X. Observe that the multiplicative order of the elements ˘c P K is
4. Therefore, the construction of an element of order 4 in the multiplicative group
of K gives us a unipotent element in X. To that end, we choose a random element
u P K and construct the sequence
un, u2n, u2
2n, . . . , u2
mn “ 1
by using the multiplication in K. Obviously, if 4 divides the multiplicative order of u,
then the construction of this sequence for u produces a unipotent element; we detect
it as a failure in reification of an involution at some step of construction. Because of
probabilistic nature of our algorithms, there is a tiny possibility that the resulting
element is semisimple – but we can use our unipotency test, Lemma 5.5, to decide
whether this element is unipotent or not. If we can not find a unipotent element
from this sequence, then we choose another element in K randomly and repeat this
procedure. Note that at least half of the elements in K have multiplicative orders
divisible by 4.
If q ” ´1 mod 4, then the coset Te2e3 has q ` 1 involutions. Since 4 does not
divide q´1 in this case, there exists no element in K satisfying x21‘1 “ 0. Therefore,
we should find a solution of the equation x21‘x22‘1 “ 0 in K. To this end, we search
for random elements x, y P K such that ax2ay2 has a square root in K, which can be
checked by using Tonelli-Shanks algorithm. By Lemma 10.1, for random x, y P K,
ax2 a y2 is a non-zero quadratic residue with probability 1{2 ´ 1{2q2. Assume
that ax2 a y2 “ c2 for some c P K, and we compute this c P K by using Tonelli-
Shanks algorithm applied in K. Then we have x2 ‘ y2 ‘ c2 “ 0, or equivalently,
x2
c2
‘ y2
c2
‘ 1 “ 0. We set a “ x{c and b “ y{c. Now, recall that bd3 lies on the
x2-axis and its coordinate is the same as the coordinate of the element b on the
x1-axis. Now, the intersection of the lines e1 _ bd3 and e2 _ a has the homogenous
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coordinate pa, b, 1q. Clearly, the construction of this intersection point produces a
candidate unipotent element in X. Finally, we use unipotency test, Lemma 5.5, to
check that it is indeed a unipotent element.
To find the characteristic of the underlying field, we compute the order of the
unipotent element that we constructed. 
We tested our algorithm in GAP for finding unipotent elements in SO3pFpq for
30-digit primes like p “ 115756986668303657898962467957: it works.
11. Coordinatization of the action of X on I, Proof of Theorem 1.3
The proof of Theorem 1.3 (a) follows from Theorem 5.1 and the proof for part
(b), namely, the construction of a black box field K, follows from the constructions
in Section 9.
11.1. Construction of the morphism X ÝÑ SO3pKq. The aim of this section is
to represent the action of an arbitrary element x P X on the projective plane P by
a 3ˆ 3 matrix ϕpxq with coefficient in K. We shall consider several cases:
Case 1. We set
ϕpe1q “
»
–1 0 00 a1 0
0 0 a1
fi
fl , ϕpe2q “
»
–a1 0 00 1 0
0 0 a1
fi
fl , ϕpe3q “
»
–a1 0 00 a1 0
0 0 1
fi
fl .
Case 2. Now we compute ϕpuq for an arbitrary involution u P X in “general
position” in the sense that u does not commute with any of ei, i “ 1, 2, 3.
If u P X then involutions ui “ eui , i “ 1, 2, 3, represent the vectors ǫui in the
projective plane P. We can compute the homogeneous coordinates pui1, ui2, ui3q of
ui using construction from Section 9.6. The vector pui1, ui2, ui3q is a scalar multiple
of ǫui . We have to normalize it by finding a scalar ci P K such that
c2i pu2i1 ` u2i2 ` u2i3q “ 1
which is done by taking a square root
ci “ ˘
d
1
u2i1 ` u2i2 ` u2i3
(see Section 9.10). The choice of signs ˘ is dictated by the need to make the matrix
U “ `u1ij˘ “
ˆ
uij
ci
˙
an involution from SO3pKq; that is, U has to have determinant 1 and be symmetric.
The choice of signs could happen to be not unique and defined up to simultaneous
change of two signs, that is, up to multiplication of U on the right by one of the
matrices ϕpeiq. Since U and ϕpeiq are involutions, their product Uϕpeiq can happen
to be an involution if and only if U and ϕpeiq commute, which is excluded by our
choice of u.
Case 3. Now let u P X be an involution not in general position, say u P CXpe1q.
Recall that C “ CXpe1q is a dihedral group. If u “ e1, we are in Case 1. If u ‰ e1,
we do random search for an involution v P X such that v and w :“ uv do not
commute with any e1, e2, e3 (this condition is satisfied with probability 1 ´Op1q )).
Then u “ vwv and we can compute ϕpvq and ϕpwq as in Case 2 and then compute
ϕpuq “ ϕpvqϕpwqϕpvq.
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Case 4. This is the general case. By Lemma 5.4, we know that every x P X is
either an involution, or a product of two or three involutions, say x “ uv; so we
compute
ϕpxq “ ϕpuqϕpvq,
where ϕpuq and ϕpvq are computed as in Cases 2 and 3.
This gives us an algorithm constructing a morphism X ÝÑ SO3pKq.
11.2. Construction of the morphism SO3pKq ÝÑ X. It is well known that each
element r in SO3pKq is either an involution or product of two involutions. In case
r is not an involtuion, we can write r as a product of two involutions using Lemma
5.4. Therefore it will suffice to compute ϕ´1prq for an involution r P SO3pKq.
We shall think of r as matrix in the same orthonormal basis in which
ϕpe1q “
»
–1 0 00 a1 0
0 0 a1
fi
fl , ϕpe2q “
»
–a1 0 00 1 0
0 0 a1
fi
fl , ϕpe3q “
»
–a1 0 00 a1 0
0 0 1
fi
fl .
As it was with computation of ϕ, we can easily reduce computation of ϕ´1prq to
the case when r is in general position, that is, r does not commute with any ϕpeiq,
i “ 1, 2, 3.
Being an involution, r is a symmetric matrix; denote its rows as r1, r2, r3. Now
construct in P points si which have in the homogeneous coordinates associated with
the basis e1, e2, e3 the coordinated vectors ri, i “ 1, 2, 3. The preimage s “ ϕ´1prq
satisfies the condition
esi “ si, i “ 1, 2, 3.
and is in general position with respect to teiu; therefore s is uniquely defined by
these conditions.
We compute an involution t1 P X such that et11 “ s1, Lemma 5.7. Then the
element (not necessarily an involution) x “ st1 belongs to C “ CXpe1q and sends e2
to ex2 “ est12 “ st12 P C. We solve the conjugation problem once more, this time in
C, and identify this element x P C; it is defined uniquely up to multiplication by an
element from E “ xe1, e2y, so we get a coset Ex as an answer. Now s P Ext1, and,
being in general position, is the only involution there.
11.3. Construction of a morphism SO3pFqq Ñ SO3pKq. Let Fq be a standard
explicitly given finite field of order q and Fp be its prime subfield. Assume also that
K0 is the prime subfield of K. Then the isomorphism Fp Ñ K0 can be extended to
an isomorphism in time polynomial in the input length to an isomorphism Fq Ñ K
[33].
12. Complexities
In this section, we compute the complexities of the main procedures presented
in this paper. Let Y be a black box group encrypting PSL2pFq for some finite field
F of odd characteristic. Let µ denote an upper bound on the time requirement
for each group operation in Y and ξ an upper bound on the time requirement, per
element, for the construction of random elements of Y. Let E be a global exponent
for Y.
In the sequel, we are going to construct a black box group X encrypting SO3pFq
from the black box group Y. By the construction of this black box group X, see
Subsection 4.3 and Theorem 5.1, the time requirement for each group operation in
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X becomes at most 4µ, see Equation (1) in Subsection 4.3. An upper bound on the
time requirement, per element, for the construction of random elements of X is 2ξ
since we compute in the direct product YˆY. Moreover, E is replaced by 2E when
we compute with the black box group X. For simplicity, we shall denote E as an
exponent for both Y and X.
We shall express complexities of our procedures in terms of µ, ξ and E. We set
E “ 2mn where p2, nq “ 1.
12.1. Constructing an involution in Y (and in X). At least the quarter of
elements in Y and in X are of even order [27, Corollary 5.3], therefore an involution
can be constructed from a random element by repeated square-and-multiply method
in time Opξ ` µ logEq.
12.2. Centralizer of an involution s in Y (and in X). By the arguments at
the end of Subsection 4.7, a generating set for CYpsq and CXpsq can be constructed
in time Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq.
12.3. Unipotency test, Lemma 5.5. For a given involution i P X and a random
element x P X, the running time for our test which decides whether the element iix is
unipotent or not is dominated by the complexity of the construction of CXpiq. There-
fore, the running time for our unipotency test is Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq.
12.4. Reification of an involution in X, Theorems 5.1 and 5.3. We present
the complexity for the algorithm in Theorem 5.3. The computation of the com-
plexity for Theorem 5.1 is the same.
Given two involutions s, t P X, we shall find the complexity of constructing the
involution j :“ s b t, if exists, which commutes with both s and t. We set z “ st
and check whether z has odd or even order which takes time Opµ logEq.
If z has even order then j P xzy can be computed in time Opµ logEq, giving the
total time Opµ logEq. If z has odd order then, as in Subsection 12.2, CXpsq can be
constructed in time Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq. At this point, we can check
whether z is unipotent or not, see Subsection 12.3. Assume that z is not unipotent.
Note that the elements in the generating set for CXpsq which are not involutions
can be taken to be generators for the torus Ts. Let STs be a generating set for Ts.
By [34, I.8], we can take |STs | “ Oplog log |F|q. Clearly S “ STsYtzu is a generating
set for X and computing the action of j on S takes Opµ log log |F|q time. Hence,
we run the product replacement algorithm on S to construct a random element x
together with its conjugate xj. Since the elements of the form xjx´1 have odd orders
with probability bounded from below by a constant, see [37], the construction of
CXpjq takes Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq time. Finally, the involution j can be
constructed from an element of even order from the torus in CXpjq by square-and-
multiply method. Hence, if z has odd order, the construction of the involution j is
Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq time.
12.5. A line through s and t. As this is an application of a reification of an
involution, if the involution j :“ sb t exits then the total time needed to construct j
is Opξ log logE`µ logE log logEq. If j does not exist for these particular involutions
s and t then the reification process returns a unipotent element u. In this case, we
construct a parabolic line xuTsys in time Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq.
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12.6. Intersection of two non-parabolic lines k and l. Given involutions
s1, s2, t1, t2 P X, where s1, s2 define a line k and t1, t2 define a line l, the inter-
section of k and l, if exists, is the involution ps1 b s2qb pt1 b t2q. Therefore, it can
be computed in time Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq, see Subsection 12.4.
12.7. Tonelli-Shanks algorithm for tori in X, Lemma 5.6. We follow the
outline presented in the proof of Lemma 5.6. Let T be a cyclic black box group.
We use the exponent E “ 2mn, n odd, for T. Let z P T be an element that has a
square root in T. Checking whether z has odd or even order takes Opµ logEq time.
If |z| is odd then the square root of z, which is zp|z|`1q{2, can be constructed in time
Opµ logEq. If |z| is even then we need to look for an element of maximal 2-height
in T. Observe that the proportion of the elements of maximal 2-height in T is
at least 1{2 and computing the 2-height of an arbitrary element takes Opµ logEq
time. The elements a, b, c and the corresponding non-negative integer d in the proof
of Lemma 5.6 can be set up in time Opµ logEq and Opµmq, respectively. As the
recursion has at most m steps and each step takes at most Opµ logEq time, the
over all construction takes Opξ ` µm logEq time.
12.8. Bisection of angles, Lemma 5.7. Given two conjugate involutions i, j P
X, we shall find the complexity of constructing a conjugating involution x P X,
that is, ix “ j. The construction of x involves finding the square root of z “ ij
and construction of centralizers of involutions. Therefore it takes Opξ log logE `
µm logEq time, see Subsection 12.7. Since m ă logE, we have Opξ log logE `
µ log2Eq.
12.9. Representation of an arbitrary element as a product of involutions,
Lemma 5.4. This is an another application of a reification of an involution, see
Subsection 12.4. Hence it takes Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq time.
12.10. Addition and multiplication in K. As described in Subsections 9.7 and
9.8, addition and multiplication in K involve constant number of reifications of
involutions. Hence they can be done in time Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq.
12.11. Tonelli-Shanks algorithm in K. By Section 12.10, a multiplication in K
can be done in time Opξ log logE`µ logE log logEq, so following the computations
in Section 12.7, Tonelli-Shanks algorithm in K runs in time Opξm logE log logE `
µm log2E log logEq. Sincem ă logE, we haveOpξ log2E log logE`µ log3E log logEq.
12.12. Constructing a unipotent element and finding the characteristic,
Theorem 1.1. The construction of three commuting involutions in a black box
group Y encrypting PSL2pFq over a field of odd characteristic involves only con-
structing involutions and their centralizers in Y. Therefore, by Subsection 12.1
and 12.2, it can be done in time Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq. The construc-
tion of a black box group X encrypting SO3 from the black box group Y takes
Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq time by Subsection 12.4. Construction of a black
box subgroup encrypting Sym4 can be done in time Opξ log logE`µ logE log logEq.
Hence, we have a set-up for the projective plane and a black box field K in time
Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq.
q ” 1 mod 4 : For a random element u P K, to check whether u has a multiplica-
tive order divisible by 4 involves logE multiplications in K. Since each multiplica-
tion in K takes Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq time and the orders of the half of
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the elements in K are divisible by 4, the construction of a unipotent element takes
at most Opξ logE log logE ` µ log2E log logEq time.
q ” ´1 mod 4 : By the complexity given in Subsection 12.11, finding elements
x, y P K where ax a y is a quadratic residue takes time Opξ log2E log logE `
µ log3E log logEq. Since the rest of the computation involves addition and multi-
plication in K, constructing lines and finding the intersections of lines, the overall
construction takes time Opξ log2E log logE ` µ log3E log logEq.
12.13. Morphism XÑ SO3pKq. We will find the complexity to represent an invo-
lution u P X in SO3pKq when u does not commute with some commuting right type
involutions e1, e2, e3 P X. Then, together with the computations in Subsection 12.9
the complexity of the representation of an arbitrary element follows.
As in Subsection 12.12, we have a set up for the projective plane and a black box
field K in time Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq. Then, the computation of the ho-
mogenous coordinates for eui “ pui1, ui2, ui3q involves finding intersections of the cor-
responding lines, so it takes Opξ log logE`µ logE log logEq time. Normalization of
eui “ pui1, ui2, ui3q involves the computation of 1u2
i1
`u2
i2
`u2
i3
and its square root ci in K.
The computation of the quotient 1
u2
i1
`u2
i2
`u2
i3
takes Opξ log logE `µ logE log logEq
time and the computation of square roots ci in K takes Opξ log2E log logE `
µ log3E log logEq time, see Subsection 12.11. Hence, the normalization of eui can
be done in time Opξ log2E log logE `µ log3E log logEq. The time needed to com-
pute the matrix U “
´
uij
ci
¯
is Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq. Hence adding all
the complexities above, we get Opξ log2E log logE ` µ log3E log logEq.
12.14. Morphism SO3pKq Ñ X. Let r P SO3pKq be an arbitrary element. To
write r as a product of two involutions in SO3pKq, we apply the same arguments
in Lemma 5.4. In this case, we take any s P SO3pKq and look for an involution
t P SO3pKq (a symmetric matrix of order 2) which inverts both r and s. Since r
and s matrices over black box field K, to find such an involution t, we solve the
corresponding systems of linear equations in K. Hence, this can be done in time
Opξ log logE ` µ logE log logEq.
Now, let r P SO3pKq be an involution. As in Subsection 12.13, it is enough
to find the complexity for the construction of a black box group element r P X
encrypting r when r does not commute with ϕpe1q, ϕpe2q, ϕpe3q. Let r1, r2, r3 be
the rows of r. Constructing the involutions s1, s2, s3 P P with the homogenous
coordinates r1, r2, r3 involve only constant number of reifications of involutions
and intersections of lines. Therefore, we can construct these involutions in time
Opξ log logE`µ logE log logEq. Constructing the desired involution r P X such that
eri “ si involves two times bisection of angles and the construction of centralizers of
involutions in X so it takes Opξ log logE ` µ log2E log logEq time by Subsections
12.2 and 12.8. Hence the running time for the construction of the black box group
element encrypting r is Opξ log logE ` µ log2E log logEq.
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